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Zusammenfassung
Die Europäische Kronzeugenregelung ist eines der wich-
tigsten Instrumente des Europäischen Wettbewerbs-
rechts. Kartellmitgliedern werden Anreize geboten, da-
mit sie illegale, für den Wettbewerb schädliche, geheime 
Absprachen gegenüber der Europäischen Kommission 
offenlegen. Ausschlaggebend für die Teilnahme am 
Kronzeugenprogramm ist für Kartelle unter anderem, 
ob ein in Aussicht stehender vollständiger oder teilwei-
ser Erlass der Geldbuße das Risiko von zivilrechtlichen 
Schadensersatzansprüchen überwiegt. Seitens der Euro-
päischen Kommission müssen Anreize zur Teilnahme am 
Kronzeugenprogramm, aber auch eine wirksame Rechts-
durchsetzung für Geschädigte implementiert werden. 
Mit der Kartellschadensersatzrichtlinie soll eine harmo-
nisierte, effektive Durchsetzung von Schadensersatzan-
sprüchen gewährleistet werden. Dieser Beitrag kommt 
zu dem Schluss, dass die Stärkung der Durchsetzung 
zivilrechtlicher Ansprüche nicht konsequent umgesetzt 
werden konnte, da eine gewisse Diskrepanz zwischen 
dem Schutzzweck der Richtlinie und der Erhaltung des 
Europäischen Kronzeugenprogramms besteht.
Abstract
The European Leniency Program constitutes an impor-
tant part of the anti-cartel enforcement and thus of the 
protection of sound competition. By offering incentives 
to cartel members, illegal detrimental agreements can be 
detected and penalized in order to stop infringement of 
the internal market. Companies willing to participate in 
the European Leniency Program however have to evalu-
ate whether the offered incentives, i.e. full or partial im-
munity from fines, outweighs the possible risk resulting 
from private enforcement. With the Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions, the harmonized, effective enforcement 
of antitrust damage claims shall be ensured. The possibility 
of private enforcement constitutes a major threat to leni-
ency applicants. It is the European Commissions’ task and 
challenge to design an anti-cartel enforcement providing 
sufficient incentives for whistleblowers, while concurrent-
ly strengthening individuals suffering from cartels. The 
results show the dilemma and contradiction between the 
protection of the individual by strengthening the private 
enforcement and the need for an appealing leniency 
program.
1. Introduction
Cartels are a major threat to the inter-
nal market since they break competi-
tion law. By their nature, cartels have 
a negative influence on the market be-
cause they limit the competition that 
normally regulates the market. As a 
result, companies participating in car-
tels limit the pressure for participants 
on the market to remain competitive. 
Cartel agreements cause even more 
damage to the economy if they are 
concluded on a multinational level. 
According to Article 101 TFEU, all 
agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertak-
ings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between member 
states and which have as their object 
or effect the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within 
the internal market are prohibited. 
All agreements or decisions between 
undertakings which are prohibited ac-
cording to Article 101 I TFEU shall be 
automatically void (Article 101 II TFEU). 
To be more precise, all agreements 
and/or concerted practices which are 
concluded between two or more com-
petitors, designed to coordinate their 
competitive behavior on the market 
and/or to influence the market, e.g. 
through illegal price-fixing or sharing 
of markets 1, are prohibited. However, 
if the prerequisites of Article 101 III 
TFEU are fulfilled (i.e. either block ex-
emption or decision in an individual 
case), the exemption rule is applicable, 
i.e. the provisions of Article 101 I TFEU 
will be declared inapplicable. In order 
to benefit from an exemption under 
Article 101 III TFEU the agreement be-
tween undertakings, the decision by 
association of undertakings or con-
certed practice has to contribute to 
the improvement of the production or 
distribution of goods or promotion of 
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technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit. However, the agree-
ment, decision or concerted practice 
may not impose restrictions which are 
not indispensable to the attainment 
of these objectives and also may not 
eliminate competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the goods in ques-
tion (Ezrachi 2016). Cartels cannot be 
subsumed under Article 101 III TFEU 
since they constitute the most serious 
violation of the prohibition according 
to Article 101 TFEU. Irrespective of 
the legal consequence of invalidity of 
any agreement or decision prohibited 
under Article 101 I TFEU, further legal 
consequences have to be observed, 
i.e. from both the European Union 
and national legislation. Article 101 II 
TFEU does not include any stipulations 
on civil penalties (e.g. indemnities). 
At national level, several legal conse-
quences may apply, such as claims for 
removal, injunctive relief or indemnity. 
However, in the absence of European 
Union law 2, it is the common position 
of the ECJ 3 that any individual can rely 
on a breach of Article 101 I TFEU in 
front of a national court and claim in-
demnity for any damage suffered due 
to the cartel infringement 4. This has 
been practice for many years. In order 
to achieve far-reaching harmonization 
on the secondary law of the member 
states in this regard, the European 
Commission published a Green Paper 
in 2005 5, followed by a White Paper 
in 2008 6, which then resulted in the 
issue of Directive 2014/104/EU 7. With 
this Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions, the European legislator set 
out coordinated rules governing ac-
tions for damages under national law 
for infringement of competition law of 
the member states and of the Europe-
an Union, as of 26th November 2014. 
By their means, directives have to be 
transposed into the national laws of 
the member states according to Arti-
cle 288 TFEU, since they are part of the 
secondary law of the European Union. 
The Directive thus only provides the 
minimum requirements to be trans-
posed into national laws. The member 
states were obligated to transpose the 
Directive into respective national laws 
until 27th December 2016 (Article 21 I 
Directive). In Germany, the transposi-
tion of the Directive into national law 
has been fulfilled with the 9. GWB No-
velle 8, which became effective on 9th 
June 2017.
This article deals with the question 
whether the special stipulations in-
cluded for leniency applicants are suffi-
cient and also lenient enough towards 
cartelists considering cooperating 
voluntarily with the European Com-
mission and/or national competent 
authorities by providing significant in-
formation on the existence of and their 
role within the cartel, independently 
of the other cartelists involved. Fur-
thermore, it is weighed whether the 
aim to protect and strengthen leniency 
programs is at the detriment of the 
protection of the individual suffering 
damages of antitrust infringements, 
as the actual protective purpose of the 
Directive. 
2. Purposes of the Directive
The Dilemma of the Detection of 
Cartels 
Anti-cartel enforcement is crucial 
for the European Union to maintain 
sound competition in the internal mar-
ket. As the responsible institution for 
competition in the European Union, 
the European Commission focusses 
on the detection of illegal detrimen-
tal agreements, the punishment of 
cartel members and the cessation of 
infringements of the internal market. 
As a matter of principle, the secrecy of 
the cartel itself is an inherent part of 
each cartel. Hence, the willingness of 
a cartel member to blow the whistle is 
indispensable for the detection of any 
and all cartels. However, companies 
will only take the risk to reveal a cartel 
if the associated incentives are appeal-
ing enough compared to the related 
risks. This sums up the dilemma of the 
detection of cartels. Whereas they are 
secret by their means, they can and 
will only be detected if a participating 
company decides the incentives are 
appealing enough to take the associ-
ated risks. Solution methods to this di-
lemma are leniency programs. 
Leniency programs 9 constitute an 
important part of anti-cartel enforce-
ment. By offering incentives to cartel 
members, illegal detrimental agree-
ments can be detected and penalized 
in order to stop the infringement of 
the internal market. Whereas on the 
one hand, the possibility of total or 
partial immunity from fines is appeal-
ing to cartel members, they also have 
to consider whether the incentives of-
fered outweigh the possible risk of pri-
vate enforcement after participation 
in the leniency program. Since deci-
sions of the European Commission are 
binding for all national courts (Recital 2 
Directive), the application for leniency 
equates to an admission of guilt, which 
can in turn also be the basis for pri-
vate enforcement. As a consequence, 
plaintiffs in a civil suit can refer to the 
decision of the European Commission 
as proof for the infringement of com-
petition law and claim for the damages 
caused to them by such an infringe-
ment (Recital 3 Directive). For the most 
part, the civil suit focusses on ques-
tions of causality and the amount of 
damages to be awarded (Rother 2017). 
2  Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law 
for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, L 349/1, Recital 11. 
3  ECJ 20.09.2001, C-453/99, 24; ECJ 13.07.2006, C-295/04 to C-298/04, 59; ECJ 14.06.2011, C-360/09, 28; ECJ 06.11.2012, C-199/11, 41; ECJ 06.06.2013, C-536/11, 
23; ECJ 05.06.2014, C-557/12, 23.
4 ECJ 20.09.2001, C-453/99, 24. 
5 Green Paper of 19.12.2005 on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672. 
6 White Paper of 2 April 2008 on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165. 
7  Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law 
for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, L 349/1, in the following “Directive”.
8 Neuntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, BGBl I p. 1416. 
9  Besides the European Leniency Program, which has been established by the European Union in 1996, several national leniency programs are also applicable such 
as the German Leniency Program. For a detailed overview see also the list of National Competition Authorities which operate a leniency program as of November 
2012: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_programme_nca.pdf.
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10 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, 2006/C 298/11, 1. 
11  In this regard European primary law means the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice; See: ECJ 20.09.2001, C-453/99, 26 et seq.; ECJ 13.07.2006, C-295/04, 
61. 
12 Green Paper of 19.12.2005 on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672, section 2.7. 
13 White Paper of 2 April 2008 on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165. 
14  European Commission; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/evidence_en.html; Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIA-
MENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union /* COM/2013/0404 final - 2013/0185 (COD), section 1.2.
Therefore, the decision to apply for 
leniency is also always associated with 
considering the risk for the leniency 
applicant to be solely liable for the 
damages caused by the whole cartel 
because the leniency applicant will, 
other than cartelists who are not will-
ing to cooperate with the European 
Commission, hardly decide for an ap-
peal procedure in case full immunity 
is granted (Bulst 2008). As a result, the 
leniency applicant has a higher risk of 
becoming the defendant of private 
enforcement. The leniency applicant 
thus risks being the sole cartelist to be 
held liable for the infringement of the 
whole cartel (Bulst 2008). It has to be 
noted that within the concept of joint 
liability, the leniency applicant could 
indeed subsequently claim damages 
from the other cartelists, but, con-
sidering that the risk of litigation and 
insolvency is always with the plaintiff, 
this constitutes yet another risk for the 
leniency applicant who decided to 
blow the whistle (Schröter & van der 
Hout 2015). Another major fear among 
cartelists is that the information pro-
vided within the leniency application 
may be used as evidence for private 
enforcement proceedings. In conclu-
sion, it is self-evident that these risks 
influence the willingness of a cartelist 
to file a leniency application. 
Strengthening of Private  
Enforcement 
The infringement of European anti-
trust law causes damage per se to the 
internal market. Cartels limit the com-
petition which normally regulates the 
market. As a result, cartelists limit the 
pressure for participants on the mar-
ket to remain competitive. Therefore, 
there is no longer the necessity to de-
velop new products or to improve the 
quality of the products because the 
concerned companies can rely on their 
market share, which is secured by the 
cartel, to name only one example. For 
the consumer, illegal practices result 
in less competitiveness on the market, 
which in turn may result in artificial 
prices 10. Individuals suffering damag-
es resulting from such infringements 
are protected according to Article 101 
and 102 TFEU since those regulations 
stipulate rights for the individual that 
have to be enforced by national courts 
(Recital 3 Directive). Regardless of this 
right that already existed under the pri-
mary law of the European Union, the 
minority of victims of infringements 
of competition law claims for damage 
compensation in civil suits (Schröter & 
van der Hout 2015). Various reasons 
can be found for that. However, the 
main aspect discouraging individuals 
from claiming antitrust damage are 
the difficulties related to evidence. It 
therefore can be stated that the ac-
cess to evidence for the infringement 
of competition law is of crucial impor-
tance for any individual claiming dam-
ages resulting from this infringement 
(Keßler 2015). Therefore, as a matter 
of fact, the subjective rights to private 
enforcement of antitrust damages 
have to be protected. 
In conclusion, two things have to be 
considered simultaneously in the de-
sign of European Competition law. On 
the one hand, the incentives provided 
for cooperation with the European 
Commission within the scope of le-
niency need to be appealing enough 
to convince cartelists to blow the 
whistle. On the other hand, subjec-
tive rights under European law, such 
as awarding damages to the victims 
of infringements of competition law, 
have to be protected. Those aspects 
were also considered and finally de-
termined during the development of 
the Directive. As a result, the Directive 
finally (after nine years and several 
attempts) implemented European pri-
mary law 11 – namely, the principle that 
any individual who suffered damages 
due to an infringement of competition 
law can claim such damages within 
civil suits – into European secondary 
law. The influence of private enforce-
ment on the effectiveness of leniency 
programs was already acknowledged 
with the Green Paper 12 on antitrust 
damages actions, followed by the 
White Paper 13 and now has finally re-
sulted in the Directive (Keßler 2015).
3. Lenient Leniency?
The European legislator pursued two 
objectives with the Directive: First, it 
shall be ensured that victims of anti-
trust infringements can claim their suf-
fered damages effectively; second, the 
interrelation between private and pub-
lic enforcement shall be optimized 14. 
The Directive focusses on removing 
procedural obstacles in private dam-
age actions to ensure protection of all 
individuals concerned, e.g. by award-
ing compensation to individuals for 
suffered damages (Recital 3 Directive). 
It has been underlined that existing di-
vergence of applicable national rules 
regarding the enforcement of compe-
tition law shall be set aside with the 
Directive in order to protect the effec-
tiveness of European competition law 
(Recitals 6, 8-10 Directive). 
The Directive clarifies that any victim of 
infringement can claim full compensa-
tion of the damages suffered, covering 
the actual loss (damnum emergens) as 
well as loss of profit (lucrum cessans), 
respectively plus interest from the 
point in time the damage occurred 
until compensation (Recital 12, Article 
3 II Directive). However, the Directive 
also explicitly excludes the possibili-
ty of overcompensation (Article 3 III 
Directive) and insofar follows conse-
quently the compensation principle, 
which is also a recognized principle in 
German law (Keßler 2015). That means 
the compensation awarded shall place 
the person who suffered the damage in 
the position in which the person would 
have been if no infringement of com-
petition law would have happened. 
Thus the individual shall not receive 
any further compensation exceeding 
that amount. 
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It is one of the greatest obstacles for 
any plaintiff in competition law pro-
ceedings to gain knowledge of evi-
dence that is relevant to substantiate 
their claim. Only sufficient evidence 
will substantiate claims of the plaintiff. 
Therefore, another important aspect 
for antitrust damages actions is the 
evidence to prove the suffered dam-
age. Since cartels are secret as a mat-
ter of principle, cartel proceedings are 
always influenced by an information 
asymmetry (Recital 15 Directive) at the 
expense of the plaintiff. In most cas-
es, the victim of the infringement ob-
tains knowledge of the infringement 
of competition law only after a deci-
sion of the European Commission and 
hence private enforcement is mostly 
subsequently in the form of so called 
“follow-on-action” (Keßler 2015). This 
fact has been acknowledged and thus 
transferred into two sections of the Di-
rective. First, Article 9 Directive stipu-
lates that a final decision of a national 
competition authority shall be irrefu-
tably established for the purposes of 
action for damages claimed before 
their national courts. That means any 
individual can refer to such a decision 
as the basis for the claim of damages 
resulting from the infringement. Sec-
ond, Articles 5 – 8 Directive extensively 
stipulate the details under which pre-
conditions the disclosure of evidence 
can be requested by a plaintiff, which 
legal aspects have to be considered by 
the national courts, and who can be 
requested to disclose evidence in such 
proceedings. Summarizing, the Direc-
tive includes numerous stipulations 
designed to strengthen private en-
forcement to protect subjective rights 
of individuals harmed by an infringe-
ment of competition law. 
However, irrespective of the main ob-
jective of the Directive to strengthen 
private enforcement, emphasis has 
also been placed on the importance 
of leniency programs and other set-
tlement procedures (Recital 26 Di-
rective). The Directive recognizes the 
importance of leniency for the detec-
tion of cartels and, therefore, special 
regulations shall apply to cartelists 
who blow the whistle “to ensure [the] 
undertakings’ continued willingness 
to approach competition authorities 
voluntarily with leniency statements 
or settlement submissions” (Recit-
al 26 Directive). Those stipulations 
somehow seem to contradict the 
rules designed to strengthen private 
enforcement. In particular, according 
to Article 6 VI Directive, the national 
law of the member states shall ensure 
that both leniency statements and 
settlement submissions are excluded 
from disclosure in front of national 
courts for the purpose of actions for 
damages. That means that no leni-
ency application or submission for 
settlement of a leniency applicant 
can be used as evidence in front of 
a national court. To understand the 
significance of this stipulation, one 
has also to consider the definition of 
the term “leniency statement”. Ac-
cording to Article 1 No. 16 Directive, 
a leniency statement includes any and 
all oral or written knowledge of a car-
tel, which is voluntarily provided to a 
competition authority. However, the 
leniency statement shall not include 
any pre-existing information. In con-
clusion, if already known information 
is included in the leniency statement, 
the rule of exemption for disclosure of 
such information in court is not appli-
cable. Consequently, such information 
could be used in proceedings relating 
to an action for damages according to 
European competition law. With this 
flexibility clause it shall be ensured 
that the exemption rule does not con-
tradict with the rights of the victim of 
the infringement to claim compensa-
tion for damages (Recital 26 Directive). 
According to Article 7 Directive, evi-
dence from the categories of leniency 
statements or settlement submissions 
shall be deemed to be inadmissible in 
actions for damages or otherwise be 
prohibited under national laws.
This exemption clause is an excellent 
illustration of the fine line the Europe-
an legislator is facing. Whereas on the 
one hand, the individual shall be pro-
tected by strengthening the private 
enforcement, on the other hand leni-
ency applicants are also considered 
with the implementation of specific 
stipulations that place immunity re-
cipients (irrespective of whether they 
are receiving total or partial immuni-
ty) in a better position. By excluding 
leniency statements as a source of 
evidence in antitrust damage actions, 
the legislator clearly favors the pro-
tection of the cartelist applying for 
leniency over the need of protection 
of the individual’s rights. One the one 
hand it seems consistent to encourage 
the participation in leniency programs 
with the benefit of the legal certainty 
that information provided within the 
scope of leniency application cannot 
be used as evidence in private enforce-
ment against the leniency applicant. 
However, it also has to be noted that 
the promotion of the leniency pro-
gram is obviously privileged over the 
strengthening of procedural rules in 
private enforcement and, in this case, 
privileged over the support to gain ev-
idence for proving suffered damages. 
It could even be conceivable for leni-
ency applicants to consider including 
a maximum of information into their 
leniency application, knowing that the 
information provided with the lenien-
cy application cannot be used as ev-
idence in civil suits. Even though this 
encourages the detection of cartels, 
this clearly contradicts the strengthen-
ing of private enforcement. 
Furthermore, special regulations re-
garding the joint and several liability 
have been implemented for immunity 
recipients. This is a considerable con-
cession to cartelists willing to coop-
erate with the European Commission 
or national competition authorities. In 
general, according to Article 11 I Direc-
tive, cartelists are jointly and severally 
liable for the damage caused. Howev-
er, Article 11 IV Directive significantly 
defuses the concept of joint liability 
by stipulating that the national law of 
the member states shall ensure that an 
immunity recipient is only jointly and 
severally liable in two cases: first, to its 
direct or indirect purchasers or provid-
ers, and second to other injured par-
ties only if full compensation cannot 
be obtained from the other cartelists 
involved in the same infringement (Ar-
ticle 11 IV Directive). That means the 
joint liability of an immunity recipient 
is restricted. The immunity recipient 
will only be held liable for damages 
caused to third parties if indemnity 
cannot be received from the other 
cartelists involved, e.g. because of 
bankruptcy or insolvency of the un-
dertaking. This obviously puts immu-
nity recipients in a better position than 
other cartelists and is another example 
for the preference for leniency appli-
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cants to the detriment of the damaged 
party (Keßler 2015). Nevertheless, as 
outlined, a cartelist will always out-
weigh the risks and rewards related to 
blowing the whistle on the existence 
and involvement in a cartel. Certain-
ly, the stipulations of Article 11 IV Di-
rective relieve immunity recipients 
from large parts of the joint liability. 
However, if the damage of victims of 
the infringement cannot be fully com-
pensated by the other cartel members 
involved in the same infringement, the 
immunity recipient will also be held li-
able for such cases. That means in case 
members of the cartel become insol-
vent and thus the injured party cannot 
be fully compensated by that cartel 
member, the cartelist who received 
immunity from either the European 
Commission or other national com-
petent authorities will nonetheless 
be held responsible for the damage 
compensation. It is, therefore, doubt-
ful whether the possible reward, i.e. in 
this case full or partial immunity from 
fines, outweighs the risk of private en-
forcement for members of the cartel. 
4. Conclusion
In summary, it can be said that the real-
ization of the two targets of the Direc-
tive, i. e. on the one hand ensuring that 
victims of antitrust infringements can 
claim suffered damages effectively 
by strengthening the private enforce-
ment while on the other hand simul-
taneously optimizing the interrelation 
between private and public enforce-
ment, was a major challenge for the 
European legislator. As demonstrated 
it is obvious that the implementation 
of specific stipulations for immunity 
recipients in order to provide incen-
tives for cartelists considering cooper-
ation with competent authorities goes 
to the detriment of the protection of 
the individual suffering damages of 
infringement of competition law by 
cartelists. In conclusion, the objective 
to strengthen private enforcement 
with specific stipulations (e.g. relief in 
questions of evidence) could not be 
pursued consequently since rules of 
exemption for the empowerment of 
leniency have also been implemented 
in the Directive. Therefore, the realiza-
tion of the objectives into the Directive 
is not entirely convincing. One can 
conclude that the European legislator 
did not fully succeed in implement-
ing secondary law that does justice to 
both immunity recipients and victims 
of their infringement. The extent to 
which the Directive will positively im-
pact the private enforcement of anti-
trust damages actions in a conclusive 
way in light of the restrictive stipula-
tions related to immunity recipients 
remains to be seen. 
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